AndroidProcesses

No longer maintained.

As of Android 7.0+, Google blocks the required /proc access for non-system apps.

If you're targeting modern Android, stop here. For historical, forensic, or academic use, read on.

TL;DR

AndroidProcesses enabled process enumeration on Android without special permissions by parsing /proc. This approach worked up through Android 6.0 (Marshmallow). Since Android 7.0 (Nougat), /proc is inaccessible to third-party apps, rendering this library ineffective on new devices.

If your work involves legacy device research, system forensics, or historical Android analysis, read on. Otherwise, note the platform’s current constraints.

Project Overview

AndroidProcesses offered a simple interface to enumerate all running processes and gather details such as PID, memory use, parent/child relationships, and more, with zero special permissions. It was widely adopted by utility apps (e.g., ES File Explorer, Clean Master, Cheetah Mobile products), amassing billions of installs and becoming a standard tool for both system utilities and academic research.

Impact in Research and Security

AndroidProcesses was widely referenced in peer-reviewed security, privacy, and systems research, including:

Security and privacy analyses of Android’s process model and sandboxing
Demonstrations of UI deception and side-channel attack feasibility
Forensic analysis, malware detection, and runtime system monitoring
Motivation and justification for major platform policy changes

Numerous scholarly articles, theses, and dissertations (see below) used this library as their practical method of process enumeration and system introspection.

Why was access restricted?

Android 7.0’s restriction of /proc access was motivated by the desire to:

Improve application sandboxing and user privacy
Prevent background apps from surveilling user activities and other processes
Close system-level attack and data leak vectors revealed by research (often using AndroidProcesses)

The trade-off: reduced process transparency and visibility for security researchers, system analysts, forensics, and device owners.

Usage (for legacy devices)

List<AndroidAppProcess> processes = AndroidProcesses.getRunningAppProcesses();
for (AndroidAppProcess process : processes) {
  String processName = process.name;
  Stat stat = process.stat();
  int pid = stat.getPid();
  // ...etc...
}

Functional on Android ≤6.0. On 7.0+, returns nothing due to system restrictions.

Alternatives

UsageStatsManager: Permission-gated, delayed, limited to usage statistics.
Accessibility Service: Not designed for process monitoring; limited and discouraged for this use case.
Custom ROMs, rooted devices, or enterprise device management: Required for deep system introspection on modern Android.

Adoption

Major adoption between 2015–2018 by ES File Explorer, Clean Master, Security Master, CM Launcher 3D, Virus Cleaner, Super Cleaner, and many more. If you analyze utility apps or OEM tools from that period, you will likely encounter AndroidProcesses.

Academic References (selected & annotated)

If referencing this library in academic work, we recommend the following citation format:

BibTeX:

@software{androidprocesses,   author = {Rummler, Jared},   title = {AndroidProcesses},   year = {2015},   publisher = {GitHub},   url = {https://github.com/jaredrummler/AndroidProcesses} }

APA: Rummler, J. (2015). AndroidProcesses [Software]. https://github.com/jaredrummler/AndroidProcesses

Selected scholarly citations:

Tuncay, G. S., Qian, J., & Gunter, C. A. (2020).

See No Evil: Phishing for Permissions with False Transparency USENIX Security 2020 Used AndroidProcesses to demonstrate UI deception and permission phishing.

Bianchi, A., et al. (2015).

What the App is That? Deception and Countermeasures in the Android User Interface IEEE S&P 2015. Referenced AndroidProcesses as a tool for studying UI deception attacks.

Spreitzer, R., Kirchengast, F., Gruss, D., & Mangard, S. (2018).

ProcHarvester: Fully Automated Analysis of Procfs Side-Channel Leaks on Android ASIACCS 2018 AndroidProcesses was cited for its practical relevance in analyzing side-channel leaks.

Simon, L., Xu, W., & Anderson, R. (2016).

Don’t Interrupt Me While I Type: Inferring Text Entered Through Gesture Typing on Android Keyboards PoPETs 2016 Showed use of process enumeration for real-world side-channel attacks.